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Introduction
Due to paternalistic governments and the lack of
social and political trust, political participation in
socialist and communist regimes has long been associ-
ated with apathy, alienation, inefficiency, or even a
sense of learned political helplessness (Gaidyte., 2012;
Gaidyte. and Muis, 2015). This situation changed
when Information and Communication Technology
(ICT) became available worldwide. Citizens now pre-
fer to use new channels and forms of activism to dis-
cuss or to make a difference in their own political
regimes (Esarey and Qiang, 2008; Kelly, 2006), and
China is no exception. By reconceptualizing collective
action as ‘a phenomenon of boundary crossing
between private and public domains,’ Bimber et al.
(2005: 365) placed these seemingly personalized
online phenomena into a larger category of collective
action, responding to the trend of integrating collec-
tive action on- and offline. Although a great deal of
research has been conducted in Western countries
over the past few decades, little is known about
Chinese collective action and its social, political, and
cultural context, which is unique and remains largely
unexplained.
According to a report by the China Internet
Network Information Center (CNNIC, 2015), by the
end of 2014, 649 million people in China were using
the Internet, making up 47.9% of the total popula-
tion. Chinese online collective action has transformed
from being a synonym for a disorderly, unhealthy, and
illegal phenomenon to a more accepted activity. It is
now commonly understood as collective behavior
with a positive social influence (Du, 2009; Qiu et al.,
2014) or ‘individual or collective efforts based on a
common effect, stimulus or target, which happened
on the Internet or were influenced by the Internet’
(Yue et al., 2010: 101). Although emphasis has been
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placed on this medium as a promising method of
political participation, a large number of questions
remain unanswered, such as the nature of online col-
lective action, the role of the Internet, and the differ-
ence between on- and offline collective action.
Based on a review of Chinese and foreign aca-
demic research, we found that most studies referred
to the demand, supply, and mobilization process of
online collective action, as proposed by Klandermans
and Van Stekelenburg (2013). This ‘market
metaphor’ has our special attention as it functions as
the roadmap for this article. Demand refers to the
mobilizing potential in a society for collective action;
it refers to the participants’ motivations, in terms of
instrumentality, identity, and ideology. People par-
ticipate in certain collective actions to try to influ-
ence the social and political environment, to
manifest one’s identification with a group, or to
express one’s opinion and views. Supply, on the other
hand, refers to the opportunities staged by organiz-
ers to protest. It refers to the resources used by the
organizations to entice people to participate in cer-
tain actions. Do organizers stage activities that
appeal to people? Demand and supply do not auto-
matically come together. Mobilization is the process
that links the two. It can be seen as the marketing
mechanism of the movement domain. Mobilization
campaigns attempt to bring demand and supply
together. The (on- and/or offline) mobilizing struc-
ture that organizers assemble is the connecting tissue
between the supply-side of organizers and their
appeals and the demand-side of participants and
their motives (Klandermans, 1997, 2002;
Klandermans and Van Stekelenburg, 2013). 
Although the differences and similarities between
each process of on- and offline activism have been
examined to some extent (Brunsting and Postmes,
2002; Earl, 2010; Earl and Kimport, 2009; Earl and
Schussman, 2002; JH Yang, 2009; Yue and Xue,
2011; Yue et al., 2010), integrated analyses are still
rare. While some studies utilized the demand-supply
theory (Klandermans, 1997, 2002; Klandermans
and Van Stekelenburg, 2013) to explain the interac-
tion between on- and offline collective action in the
Western context, it is unclear whether these findings
can be generalized to other social and cultural con-
texts (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2013).
According to Lipset (1959) and ‘revised moderniza-
tion theory’ (Inglehart and Welzel, 2010), economic
growth may prompt collective action participation
and democracy by changing people’s values, at least
in Western societies. On the other hand, the dramat-
ic growth of on- and offline collective action (Göbel
and Ong, 2012) and the changing values structure
from traditional Confucian values to materialism or
post-materialism (Wu, 2013) in prosperous areas of
China indicate that collective action in this country
is undergoing similar processes to Western countries.
Therefore, we expect the demand-supply model to
be applicable to collective action in China also. 
To understand the bigger picture of online collec-
tive action in contemporary China and to answer the
questions mentioned above, we attempt to integrate
relevant work within the framework of the demand-
supply theory, and discuss it in terms of the social,
political, and cultural context of China. The nature,
effect, and future of online collective action in China
will be discussed in the conclusion of the article.
Supply of online collective action
Resource mobilization and political process theory
emphasize that the key factors influencing participa-
tion in collective action are resources and political
opportunities available to aggrieved people; griev-
ances are ubiquitous, while collective action is not
(McCarthy and Zald, 1987). Therefore, we focus
first on the supply of online collective action, partic-
ularly the specific political context and the role of the
Internet in arousing, maintaining, and strengthening
instrumental, identity, and ideological motivation.
Political environment
Political policy in relation to the Internet in shaping
the macro context of online collective action remains
controversial. On the one hand, the Chinese govern-
ment promotes the IT industry and encourages civic
expression, but on the other hand, various strategies
are used to control and disrupt communication and
the diffusion of information online. First, the gov-
ernment attempts to formulate behavioral norms
and duties for Internet users and service providers by
promulgating regulations directly. For example,
Netizens (wangmin)1 are not allowed to post infor-
mation harmful to national interests, and Internet
companies are responsible for censoring and manag-
ing information disseminated on their websites
(Yang, 2003). Second, the Chinese authorities use
various indirect censorship strategies that create
covert boundaries to online behavior, for example,
automatically filtering keywords through the use of
computer technology, or by employing human labor
to physically monitor and delete sensitive topics
(Esarey and Qiang, 2008; Svensson, 2014; Yang,
2003, 2006). Third, to induce self-regulating behav-
ior, psychological measures or ideological propagan-
da, such as punishing the violator publicly and
emphasizing public and national interests, are used
to repress and cultivate Internet users and compa-
nies, making them feel they are always being
watched and controlled (Svensson, 2014; Yang,
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2006). Finally, when websites or forums are out of
control from the Chinese government’s perspective,
such as when they disseminate or discuss sensitive
topics, or call for collective action, they are blocked
or shut down (Yang, 2003). When Internet users
transgress the boundaries, they may be in danger of
having their online accounts closed, or even being
imprisoned. One notorious case concerns a well-
known micro-blogger, Xue Manzi, with over 12 mil-
lion followers on Sina Weibo, who was accused of
soliciting prostitutes and was forced to confess pub-
licly on CCTV that he was ‘the maker and peddler
of rumors’ (Svensson, 2014; Yang, 2014).
Overall, when analyzing the Chinese govern-
ment’s policies and strategies (Zheng and Zhang,
2012), we found that most of them reflect so-called
paternalistic administration (Gaidyte., 2012). The
goal is to prompt the development of a harmonious
society, as well as to consolidate the government’s
authority and domination. Limited freedom of
information is allowed as long as it is within set
boundaries. In this sense, the government and the
public are cooperators; the state requires people to
express their opinions and emotions on various non-
sensitive issues, which serve to reveal social problems
and potential threats to the leadership (Balla, 2012;
Zheng and Zhang, 2012). Once the limit is exceed-
ed, the interaction between Netizens and the govern-
ment becomes more conflictive, which in turn may
enhance cooperation among Internet users, or even
motivate Chinese-style action online (Zheng and
Wu, 2005).
Instrumentality
As mentioned above, instrumentality, identity, and
ideology are three important motivations and social
psychological mechanisms behind people’s participa-
tion in collective action. Studies relating to the sup-
ply of collective action primarily focus on repertoires
and effectiveness, as well as on the ideology and
social identity supplied by the organization to attract
potential participants (Klandermans, 2002;
Klandermans and Van Stekelenburg, 2013).
We start with instrumentality of supply. Issues
such as operational efficacy, social influence, power,
and charismatic leaders represent classic efficacy and
instrumentality in offline activism (Klandermans,
2002; Klandermans and Van Stekelenburg, 2013).
However, these issues seem to be less important
when it comes to online activism. Although having
thousands of ‘followers’ or ‘likes’ might create a new
mode of power and charisma, and therewith social
influence, this definitely needs more research.
Having said that, the Internet does provide the sup-
ply-side with instrumental power, because of the
low-cost, widespread, and decentralized dissemina-
tion of the Internet, it provides opportunities to
overcome the barriers thrown up by the tight hold
the Chinese government has over social organiza-
tions and traditional media (we will elaborate on this
below). We focus first on the basic elements of the
story, including who is the organizer, where the event
is happening, and the role of the Internet. 
Communication on the Internet: We first dis-
cuss communication on the Internet, as it is the basic
element determining the characteristics of online
collective action. Scholars in Western countries have
already elucidated the role of the Internet in stimu-
lating collective action, and there are three important
factors equally applicable to China (Yang, 2003).
Though these are related to each other and their
influence overlaps, they still play distinct roles in
shaping the demand, supply, and mobilization of
online collective action. The first factor is that the
low cost of communicating online facilitates both
the publication of and access to information on par-
ticular collective actions. It also reduces the cost of
participation and organization (Kelly, 2006). The
low cost may even alter the fundamental mecha-
nisms of participation, that is, the free-rider dilemma
may be reduced or vanish altogether online, and
resource mobilization theory may be reformulated
when activism is no longer so costly (Bimber et al.,
2005; Earl et al., 2010). The second factor is that the
Internet encourages the diffusion of information on
an unprecedented scale and allows collaboration to
be more place and time independent. The new mode
of communication offered by the Internet also makes
censorship and repression of dissenting opinions
more difficult, which attracts more and more people
to use the Internet to get information and commu-
nicate (Alberici and Milesi, 2016; Lei, 2011; Van
Laer and Van Aelst, 2010). Finally, the decentraliza-
tion of online communication changes the status of
Netizens from passively receiving news to actively
searching, framing, and releasing information
(Esarey and Qiang, 2008; Qiu, 2009), which
increases the power and independence of the public
and undermines opinions propagated by the official
media (Lei, 2011).
In addition, Göbel and Ong (2012) pointed to
the special role of Chinese ICTs in compensating for
the inadequacy of formal channels to express discon-
tent to the authorities. ICTs improve the ability of
the public to obtain information relating to their
well-being or learn from the experience of previous
initiatives, and connect activists and potential partic-
ipants in sharing grievances or organizing activities.
In short, the new features of online communication
as the basic supply structure can endow new power
to other elements and may bring about new arts of
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collective action (Yang, 2003).
Vir tual community platform: Although driven
primarily by commercial interests, virtual 
communities such as sohu.com (www.sohu.com/),
Sina.com (www.sina.com/), and Netease.com
(www.163.com/) have become important channels
for political participation in contemporary China.
Three influential platforms have emerged on the
Chinese Internet. The first was the Bulletin Board
System (BBS), created in 1998 (Zheng and Zhang,
2012), which, as a variation of wall posters in the
information age in China, also takes on the role of
voicing dissent and motivating potential activists
both on- and offline (G Yang, 2009a). It remains
popular and influential today. One example is the
‘Strengthening the Nation Forum’ (Qiangguo lun-
tan), where thousands of posts and a high level of
responses are observed each day; topics range from
national events to Chinese political, economic, and
societal issues. The users even openly discuss how to
use BBS to improve democratic government (Yang,
2003). 
The second platform is blogs, which became the
dominant online platform following their introduc-
tion in China in 2002. The popularity of blogs can
be partly explained by their advantages in terms of
communication and organization, such as horizontal
network, low-cost participation, relatively independ-
ent bloggers, and high speed of information diffu-
sion (Esarey and Qiang, 2008; Zheng and Zhang,
2012). 
The third platform is micro-blogs (weibo2),
which were created in 2010 and are similar to
Twitter in Western countries (Zheng and Zhang,
2012). The most famous micro-blog platforms in
China are Sina Weibo and Tencent Weibo, with 536
and 540 million accounts, respectively, by 2013 (PL
Li et al., 2013). In contrast to the fading of Twitter
in most countries, more Chinese now prefer weibo to
obtain firsthand and diverse information, share
opinions, respond quickly to emerging events, and
initiate activities (Svensson, 2014). 
Organization structure online: NGOs,
SMOs, and self-organization: As scholars have
previously indicated, the Internet provides a plat-
form for formal organizations, such as non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs) or social movement
organizations (SMOs), and facilitates their mobiliza-
tion and organization of collective action both on-
and offline. Moreover, the Internet also gave birth to
a relatively novel self-organization, allowing the rise
of online opinion leaders and personalized content
sharing (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012), which is 
particularly important in China.
First, in Western countries, NGOs and SMOs
use the Internet to distribute information on the rea-
sons, goals, and strategies of particular planned activ-
ities (Van Laer and Van Aelst, 2010). However, in
China, social movement organizations are under
strict supervision, have no true legitimate existence,
and receive little attention (White et al., 1996Yang,
2003). Many social groups and organizations have
chosen websites, BBS, and email lists to build and
enhance their networks. They may have an offline
entity or be wholly web-based, but they typically
operate both on- and offline. Yang (2006) has stated
that the most active Internet-mediated networks in
China are probably the environmental associations,
such as Green-web (www.green-web.org/), Greener-
Beijing (www.gbi.org.cn/), and Desert.org.cn
(www.desert.org.cn/). Among these web-based
groups, Green-web and Greener-Beijing, with 4000
and 2700 registered members respectively, are rela-
tively better known (Yang, 2006).
Second, ICTs have empowered ordinary people
by expanding their access to information and allow-
ing them the opportunity to set the political agenda.
The Internet also significantly reduces the cost of
organizing actions and participating in politics. As in
other countries, the self-organized structure in China
can also be described as organizationally decentered,
distributed, or flattened  (Bennett and Segerberg,
2012) because the Internet provides an inexpensive,
convenient, and flexible participation channel for
the grassroots, and there is no need to establish or
rely on professional SMOs in some collective actions
(Bimber, 1998; Earl and Kimport, 2009; Earl and
Schussman, 2002). Yet, the situation is still difficult
for Chinese cyber activists when compared with
Western regions where individuals or small groups
can use specialized websites (such as
petitiononline.com) or tools to create, host, or devel-
op actions themselves (Earl, 2013). In China, most
self-organized actions are still within the commercial
virtual communities and under close supervision.
They enjoy relative freedom and imagined empower-
ment through invisible measures (Gong and Yang,
2010; Zhang, 2012). 
All of these conditions have created a new gener-
ation of online opinion leaders and a new type of
self-organized participant, when compared with the
formal leadership and organizations emphasized in
classical collective action theories (Earl, 2013; Earl
and Kimport, 2009; Esarey and Qiang, 2008; Sheng
and Gao, 2013; Svensson, 2014). On the one hand,
the traditional elites and public intellectuals have
become more visible and influential due to the rela-
tively unconstrained, equal, and pluralistic Internet
technology. On the other hand, a group of opinion
leaders is emerging, with diverse identities, such as
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executives, scholars, entertainment stars, and offi-
cials. And they usually possess the critical informa-
tion sources and complex communication networks
which significantly contribute to their status, power,
and charisma (Sheng and Gao, 2013; Svensson,
2014). For example, Pan Shiyi, who is a Chinese
entrepreneur and one of the most influential opinion
leaders on weibo with more than 14 million follow-
ers, posts the air pollution index for Beijing and
Shanghai every day (Sheng and Gao, 2013; Zhang,
2012). Or take Yao Chen, a famous Chinese actor,
whose posts on social and public welfare issues have
the largest number of followers in weibo (about 35
million).
Identity and ideology
In addition to instrumentality, the identity and ide-
ology provided by organizations or groups are two
other important factors that attract people to partic-
ipate in traditional collective action. Online collec-
tive action is dominated by self-organization and
individual action. Identity may develop in one of
three ways as a result of Internet usage, and corre-
spond to different forms of activism: (1) existing col-
lective identity is strengthened; (2) a new collective
identity is formed; or (3) an individual identity and
personalized expression is formed beyond a common
group identity (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012; Gong
and Yang, 2010). First, the Internet provides various
opportunities to enhance the bond between an
organization and group members, which can be seen
as the extension of collective identity offline and can
be illustrated by collective actions mobilized by
NGOs or other groups (Bennett and Segerberg,
2012). Second, new technology prompts the discus-
sion and interaction among dispersed people, shap-
ing group boundaries and fostering collective
identities based on common interest, beliefs, and
ideas (Kelly, 2006). Moreover, the anonymous
nature of computer-mediated communication
(CMC) could distract people’s attention from other
identities and result in new group norms becoming
more salient or make the character of the imagined
community closer to their own expectations
(Alberici and Milesi, 2016; Polletta et al., 2013;
Zhang, 2012). False consensus effect and overestima-
tion of group efficacy (Brunsting and Postmes,
2002) may contribute to the popularity of self-
organized action online. At times, the virtual self-
organized communities transform into actual entities
and may exert a social impact on further interaction
(Gong and Yang, 2010). Third, in China – where
social organizations or groups are rare and most
interactions are controlled – a relatively decentered,
flattened, or distributed form of online collective
action is particularly evident, which is based prima-
rily on the sharing of personal beliefs, information,
and activities through BBS, blogs, websites, and
other media platforms, without latent or salient col-
lective identity (Bimber et al., 2005). 
In addition, collective action organizations dis-
seminate social-political ideology and beliefs, frame
collective action by emphasizing the unfairness in
society, disadvantaged groups, or the duty of the
public, or connect goals with a basic framework such
as human, female, and animal rights (Klandermans,
2002). In contemporary China, one focus of the
public discourse is the power struggle of the grass-
roots population. Underlying the interaction of cul-
ture, political control, and communication
technology, a new spirit of cultural irony is gradual-
ly becoming popular and influential (Gong and
Yang, 2010). Although not aimed at subverting the
political regime, the powerless people in China now
prefer to use dark humor, parody, and satire online to
express their discontent with social inequality and
abuse of power, and also to criticize and challenge
the discourses and ideologies propagated by the
authorities (Zheng and Zhang, 2012).
Demand of online collective action
As the ‘demand-supply’ theory hypothesizes, people
partake in collective action and social movements
because their motivations are rooted in one or more
type of grievances (Klandermans, 1997). Although
these basic motivations are typically discussed in the
Western context, they seem to apply to the Chinese
context, too. Yet, we can also observe some specifi-
cally Chinese types of grievances based on the coun-
try’s particular social and political background.
Root cause: grievances
The majority of the motivations behind Chinese
online collective action are rooted in discontent
stemming from the real worldalthough the Internet
has also produced new issues and grievances for civil
engagement and protest (Polletta et al., 2013).
Specifically, the rapid economic development since
the post-Mao reforms has resulted in citizens with a
consciousness and willingness to participate politi-
cally. At the same time, the uncoordinated growth of
the social system and the misconduct of some offi-
cials accelerated the unequal distribution of social
wealth and power, leading to a build up of social
conflict (Liu, 2012; LR Li et al., 2013; Qiu et al.,
2014; Zhang and Chen, 2012). Due to the lack 
of formal channels for expression and resistance,
Chinese citizens used the Internet to seek and 
propagate information on incidents or events 
exemplifying their discontent (Pei, 2000). It is inter-
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esting that the underling psychological attributes of
these ‘hot events’ correspond to the categories of
grievances proposed by Klandermans (1997).
First, events labeled as ‘social injustice,’ ‘rights
protest,’ ‘economic exploitation,’ and ‘culture strug-
gle’ are often the result of the unhealthy political sys-
tem, inappropriate management, and the unequal
allocation of resources. These issues adversely affect
people’s economic situation, their rights to a stan-
dard of living and development, as well as the oppor-
tunities for information and expression. Second, the
discontent triggered by ‘international events,’
‘nationalism,’ ‘intergroup conflict,’ and ‘environ-
mental issues’ is contributed to by unexpected
encounters that violate or threaten the rights of citi-
zens. For instance, in September 2012, the Japanese
government purchased three of the Senkaku Islands
from their private owner and nationalized them. The
ownership of the Senkaku Islands has been source of
a conflict between China and Japan for hundreds of
years, and the Japanese government’s actions aroused
great anger and a huge wave of protest both on- and
offline in China. Finally, events such as ‘official cor-
ruption,’ ‘abuse of power,’ ‘immorality of the rich
and famous,’ and ‘deviance and scandals’ contradict
the important moral and value codes in China and
could incite anger and condemnation among people.
In June 2011, a woman bragged about her wealth on
her micro-web. It was then implied by Netizens that
she had a close relationship with the Red Cross,
which resulted in a serious crisis of trust in the Red
Cross and a drop in donations around the country
(Du and Wei, 2010; Qiu et al., 2014; Yang, 2014).
However, most events do not involve one simple
grievance. For example, incidents involving govern-
ment officials or the rich not only violate moral prin-
ciples, but also directly reflect the unjust distribution
of resources and power, and even contribute to fur-
ther disadvantage people. Sudden natural disasters
may also deepen public distrust and discontent
towards the government if improper management
was an underlying factor. Moreover, issues such as
‘social injustice,’ ‘international events,’ and ‘official
corruption’ characterize and are the primary content
of the instrumental, identity, and ideological motiva-
tions for online activism in China.
Motivations for par ticipation in online
collective action
In order for people to participate in collective action,
widespread grievances are not sufficient; grievances
must be transformed into motives, including instru-
mental, identity, and ideological motives
(Klandermans, 1997). Although the basic content
and mechanisms of these motives are consistent
across many situations, specific differences can be
discovered depending on unique contexts (Van
Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2014; Van
Stekelenburg et al., 2009). Generally speaking, most
on- and offline collective action in the contemporary
Chinese context does not oppose the existing politi-
cal system and ideology because of Confucianism
and market economic values. Confucianism culti-
vates obedience to authoritywhile market economic
values make material interests relatively more impor-
tant (PL Li et al., 2013; Liu, 2008).  
Specifically, with regard to instrumentality, peo-
ple participating in Internet-based activism want to
use the new media to demand their rights or inter-
ests, and believe that they can obtain support from
the public or influence the government’s decision-
making through collective efforts both on- and
offline. Therefore, they tend to finish the action once
their goal is achieved or the triggering event has
ended (Balla, 2012; Qiu et al., 2014; Xue et al.,
2013; Zhang and Chen, 2012).
Second, research shows that group identity,
which is based on common beliefs and background,
is created during online interaction, and is signifi-
cantly predictive of participation in online action in
China (Qiu, 2009; Qiu et al., 2014). Qiu et al.
(2014) found that some Netizens who join social
and political online communities expressed care for
the fate of their nation and its people, were con-
cerned about social problems, and understood that
rebuilding social justice was their responsibility.
However, they also found that some people joined
online communities, groups, or organizations out of
loneliness or the desire to belong. When these iden-
tities with online communities or groups were
threatened, they were more likely to take action, par-
ticularly radical action. Moreover, Xue et al. (2013)
proposed that participants who join in the same
action might be driven by two different levels of
identification: identification with the group at stake
or identification with the social movement organiza-
tion. Specifically, people with a strong identification
with the group at stake, such as national identity,
took part in online activism because they felt angry
and efficacious, while people with a strong organiza-
tional identity, such as school identity, participated
in online actions merely because they perceived high
efficacy.
Finally, there appears to be a difference in the ide-
ological motivation between Western countries and
China in terms of content and mechanism. On the
one hand, Western societies have experienced a shift
from long-term social movements driven by clear
ideologies and based on a stable social group identi-
ty, to personalized actions focused on self-expression
and participation, and propelled by new media 
technology (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012; Inglehart
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and Welzel, 2010; Klandermans et al., 1988; Qiu et
al., 2014). However, in China, most justice-driven
collective action triggered by the violation of groups’
morals is usually transient, without specific ideology
or fixed social identity. Netizens attempt to express
their own opinions and emotions via various kinds
of behaviors, or to restore justice by having an
impact on certain people or the government. Once
their demands are satisfied or the reason has dissipat-
ed, the actions come to an end (Qiu, 2009; Qiu et
al., 2014; Zhang and Chen, 2012). On the other
hand, evidence has shown that, in the context of
international and humanitarian events, ideological
motivation plays a more important role in initiating
Chinese people’s participation, especially when these
are low risk and low cost activities, compared to high
risk and high cost activities (Xue et al., 2014).
Mobilization of online collective action 
Evidence has shown that demand and supply alone
are not sufficient to result in collective action, it
requires mobilization to bring people together.
Mobilization can be divided into two strands: con-
sensus mobilization and action mobilization.
Consensus mobilization refers to the transmission of
the goals and ideology of the action organization.
The more successful consensus mobilization is, the
larger the pool of sympathizers a mobilizing move-
ment organization can draw from. In their frame
alignment approach to mobilization, Snow and
Benford and their colleagues elaborate on consensus
mobilization much further (see Benford, 1997 for a
critical review; and Snow et al., 2004 for an
overview). Action mobilization, on the other hand,
refers to the process of transforming a potential par-
ticipant who identifies with the views of the action
organization into an actual participant
(Klandermans and Van Stekelenburg, 2013).
Klandermans and Oegema (1987) broke the process
of action mobilization down into four separate steps:
people (1) need to sympathize with the cause, (2)
need to know about the upcoming event, (3) must
want to participate, and (4) must be able to partici-
pate (see Figure 1). 
Each step brings the supply and demand of
protest closer together until an individual eventually
takes the final step to participate in an instance of
political protest. It is interesting that this framework
of mobilization can also be applied to self-organizing
online activism, whose mobilization process includes
a series of steps: forming shared grievances among
the public, framing an appealing goal, reaching as
many potential participants as possible, and con-
quering barriers to take action.
Consensus mobilization
Chinese people are used to the domination of the
state without opposition because of the government’s
strategy of isolating people from foreign information
and ideology and the centralized party ideology that
cultivates in the public authoritarian values through
the education system and the official media.
Although there are questions and discontent among
the public, it was not until the emergence and ubiq-
Not a sympathizer
Not targeted
Not motivated
Participant
Not a participant
Figure 1. The process of  action mobilization (Klandermans and Oegema, 1987)
Sympathizer
Targeted
Motivated
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uitous use of the Internet that the public was provid-
ed with varying opinions (Esarey and Qiang, 2008;
Yang, 2006). As Lei (2011) discovered, compared
with traditional media and non-media users,
Chinese Netizens were more critical of the party-
state and more likely to support the norms of
democracy. These politicized Netizens constitute a
potential and active group of participants to chal-
lenge the authoritarian rules.
An important mechanism of dissemination
online is that opinion leaders act as online citizen
journalists, linking the outside world and home,
both on- and offline. There are many differences
between traditional journalists and online citizen
journalists. The former earn a salary as a journalist
and are supervised by the official media system
which is controlled or managed by governments at
different levels, so their behavior is more con-
strained. The latter are relatively independent and
anonymous, with crucial information resources and
complex networks, and are more credible and influ-
ential among Netizens (Esarey and Qiang, 2008;
Svensson, 2014). The opinion leaders on weibo, for
example, whose followers can range from hundreds
of thousands to millions, typically release firsthand
information drawn from their own experience, and
transmit other critical information. Therefore, the
information being transmitted and discussed by
other Netizens becomes the focus of public opinion,
which can lead to consensus or action mobilization
(Sheng and Gao, 2013).
Action mobilization
Frame the reason, find the target, and tell
people what to do: While the public has agreed
upon a general shared grievance, people still need an
explanation of the events or actions to evoke their
anger and indignation and motivation to protest.
This is what a collective action frame does, a collec-
tive action frame provides a coherent message on: (1)
what’s going on? (2) who is to blame? and (3) what
can we do?
The first step in action mobilization is to create as
large a pool of sympathizers as possible. As Snow and
Benford (1988, 2000) have demonstrated, a collec-
tive action frame that interprets events or occur-
rences through a certain meaning or belief can assist
in ‘mobilizing potential adherents and constituents,
to garner bystander support, and to demobilize
antagonists’ through inspiring the emotions of
bystanders and legitimizing the activities (Snow and
Benford, 1988: 198). Moreover, the social and cul-
tural background must be taken into consideration
to understand how a collective action frame shapes
the reactions of the public regarding an event. As
mentioned previously, events that are conceived in
terms of corruption, wealth, and power attract more
attention and incite action among the Netizens
(Yang, 2006). For example, in 2008, Zhou Jiugeng,
the Secretary of the Real Estate Office and Civil
Administration Office in the Jiangning district in
Nanjing City, gave a speech about high real estate
prices, causing discontentment and anger. However,
the speech did not attract attention until someone
noticed his expensive watch and other luxuries,
which resulted in a collective investigation of his pri-
vate situation, leading to the exposure of bribery.
The second step in action mobilization is to
spread the call for action to a large constituency.
Networks and organizations play a crucial role in this
stage. Benefiting from the technology of the
Internet, social networks have extended their role
from a communication tool in traditional collective
action (Klandermans and Van Stekelenburg, 2013)
to an organizing agent (Bennett and Segerberg,
2012). Specifically, social organizations and informal
groups in China have created web pages and BBS
forums to establish group identities, or created links
with peer and other international organizations to
form loose networks. For example, to protect the Nu
River3 in 2003, an email list and campaign website
were created to disseminate information regarding
the action and to facilitate discussion on campaign
strategies. The shift from organizational mobiliza-
tion to personal mobilization in modern society
indicates the popularity and function of personal
level networks. That is to say, by sharing personal
information, ideas, or relationships on BBS, web-
sites, blogs, micro-blogs, or across these virtual com-
munities simultaneously, a new communication
network, functioning as the core organization, is
formed, grows, and gains stability based on certain
events (Bennett and Segerberg, 2011; Castells, 2004;
Yang, 2006). Moreover, though without strong orga-
nizational control, the distribution of resources and
power in this social network is not even. Powerless
individual actors or so-called ‘losers,’ such as migrant
workers, still require the assistance of opinion leaders
to organize successful actions. For example, in 2012,
a migrant school founded by migrant workers in
Beijing was closed down by the local government. In
desperation, the schoolmaster, who was a migrant
singer prior to working at the school, wrote posts on
weibo to ask for assistance. After his posts were for-
warded by celebrities, scholars, and NGOs, the clo-
sure received media attention and the school was
saved (Svensson, 2014).
Activities combined with motivation: The
third step in action mobilization is selecting or
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organizing specific activities according to the social
psychological motivations of the sympathizers
(Klandermans and Van Stekelenburg, 2013). Several
novel types of collective action have been created
during online interaction (Flam, 2005; Polletta et al.,
2013; Van Laer and Van Aelst, 2010). In this section,
we illustrate some unique forms of activism in con-
temporary China and explore their underlying social
psychological mechanisms.
Online collective action can be divided into three
forms, or levels: (1) verbal expression online; (2)
behavior expression online; and (3) crowd event
online (Yue et al., 2010). First, verbal expression
online, a common form of activism worldwide (Earl,
2013), refers to the Netizens expressing an opinion
or emotion regarding a certain event or collective
action through the utilization of BBS, chatroom,
blog, wiki, or other platform. Moreover, in China,
the public also uses this form to exert pressure on rel-
evant government officials or authorities to seek
change to an undesirable situation, since there are
seldom formal channels for them to achieve this
goal. As has been found, this type of collective ‘voice’
is deemed acceptable by the state and can make a dif-
ference, when it is not attempting to undermine the
state (Zheng and Wu, 2005).
Second, behavior expression online refers to
actions that only happen on the Internet and are
spontaneous and unorganized, including individual
behaviors. It also reflects the transformation of the
pattern of collective action participation, from orga-
nizational-based, ‘identity politics,’ long-term
engagements, and forms of collective behaviors to
individual- or informal group-based, ‘issue politics,’
temporary engagements, and more personalized
forms of behaviors (Roggeband and Duyvendak,
2013).
Typical Chinese examples of behavior expression
online are individual efforts such as egao and collec-
tive efforts, including ‘human flesh research.’ Egao,
defined by China Daily as ‘a popular subculture that
deconstructs serious themes to entertain people with
comedy effects. The two characters “e” meaning
“evil” and “gao” meaning “work” combine to
describe a subculture that is characterized by humor,
revelry, subversion, grass-root spontaneity, defiance
of authority, mass participation and multi-media
high-tech’ (Gong and Yang, 2010: 4). Egao can be
seen as a counterpart to ‘culture jamming’ in
Western countries (Van Lear and Van Aelst, 2010).
The popularity of egao in modern China is not only
due to its entertainment function, but also because
of the opportunity and vehicle it offers powerless
people to express their discontentment and to trans-
gress social stratification (Esarey and Qiang, 2008;
Flam, 2005; Gong and Yang, 2010). Therefore,
some scholars prefer to use ‘liberating cultural prac-
tice’ to interpret it rather than seeing it as ‘something
detrimental to the establishment’ (Gong and Yang,
2010). One of the most famous examples is the
video The Bloody Case of a Steamed Bun, created by
Hu Ge, a grassroots activist in China. Ge attempted
to remake the film The Promise, which was directed
by Chen Kaige, a world-famous director, to express
his disappointment with the film. The video was
then quickly shared online, created discussion, and
was influential on the Internet (Gong and Yang,
2010).
‘Human flesh research’ (ren rou sou suo) is an
extreme and influential online collective behavior in
China and used as an important self-empowering
means to judge corrupt government officials or
immoral individuals (Qiu et al., 2014). It calls for
collaborative research among Internet users to track
the process of an event, to find the identity of a per-
son, or to reveal the truth of an incident (Wang et
al., 2010; Yin and He, 2011; Yue et al., 2010). It typ-
ically begins with a widespread post pointing to an
immoral event or questionable behavior. Then,
Internet experts or hackers follow up on the event
and act as the leader to organize collective searches
exposing detailed information about the event or
person involved. Ordinary Netizens are in charge of
denouncing the guilty party by commenting or pro-
viding information. Under the pressure of public
opinion, the targeted person may appear on the
Internet to clarify the truth or apologize. Sometimes,
an offline force (typically the government) will inter-
vene to punish the responsible person or control the
development of the event (Ren, 2008). For example,
in 2006, a short video about a Chinese woman who
killed a kitten with her high heel was disseminated
widely on the Internet, which triggered great anger
and discussion online. After voluntary collaboration
of thousands of Netizens, her identity and personal
information were disclosed and she was forced to
leave her job and move.
Finally, compared with online verbal expression
and behavior expression which only happen on the
Internet, ‘crowd event online’ mainly refers to group
activities which involve online and offline interac-
tions. Qiu et al. (2014) noted that this collective
behavior was not highly organized, nor did it involve
a clear ideology. Du and Wei (2010: 44, our transla-
tion) have also argued that the nature of crowd
events online is ‘a kind of communication process
mobilized by the group of Netizens who base [the
event] on a specific theme and different purposes,
and use the method of online assembly to create
social opinion or prompt social action. It may be
spontaneous or organized, may be orderly, healthy,
or disorderly, unhealthy.’ Crowd event online could
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be triggered by an online post or an offline event.
The final development of the event into the real
world indicates its influence and the need for addi-
tional motivation and mobilization, to some extent.
For example, in 2006, a PX chemical industry proj-
ect was accused of causing huge levels of pollution in
Xiamen. The legal options to oppose the project
were not successful, so the local residents organized a
demonstration using the Internet and mobile phones
to disseminate information around the action and to
mobilize people to participate (G Yang, 2009a; Yue
et al., 2010).
Overcoming barriers: Finally, the last step in
action mobilization is to overcome the barriers
inherent to collective action. Hence, people are sym-
pathizing with the cause, they know about the
upcoming event, and they are motivated to take part.
Yet, still at this stage barriers can prevent them from
taking action. Important questions concerning barri-
ers are how to avoid government supervision, and
how to maximize the effects of the action. 
In Western countries, mature websites or ‘Action
Centers’ have been created to facilitate various col-
lective actions both on- and offline (Earl, 2010).
However, in China, public expression, particularly
involving criticism of the state or state policy, advo-
cating political action, or openly conflicting with
party ideology, remains subject to severe censorship
and control (Esarey and Qiang, 2008: 756). In order
to entice people to participate in political topics that
concern them, many strategies have been employed.
For example, some social groups have attempted to
launch political discussions on non-political websites
such as Jin Yong Martial Arts Novels, a website that
focuses on individuals’ shared hobbies (Zheng and
Wu, 2005). For ordinary Netizens or individual
activists, to avoid censorship or lower their risk, a
new strategy of ‘protective’ irony in the way they
express themselves has emerged on the Internet char-
acterized by the use of abstract, satirical, and coded
language, and neologisms, influenced by Chinese
traditional culture (Esarey and Qiang, 2008, 2011;
G Yang, 2009a; Zheng and Zhang, 2012). For exam-
ple, the word ‘harmonize’ (he-xie), from the party’s
propaganda of ‘a harmonious society’ is used to sati-
rize state censorship or repression (Zheng and
Zhang, 2012). The use of the passive voice  and past
participle ‘be done,’ such as ‘be harmonized,’ ‘be sui-
cided,’ and ‘be benefited’ was also used to ridicule
the disadvantaged and passive status of the grassroots
Netizens themselves (Shi, 2009). It should be noted
that this kind of humor could be used in various
types of online collective action, particularly in ver-
bal expression. 
However, most of the time, in order for their
voice to be widely heard or achieve the goal of the
action, activists or organizations obtain assistance
from the traditional media, which is controlled by
the state or high-level government authorities. The
role of the central media is particularly important
when people want to uncover and punish the mis-
conduct of local government. Researchers in China
have found that ‘initiating on the Internet’ + ‘involv-
ing the central media’ + ‘eye-catching’ is a successful
combination to disseminate information, and that
‘involving the central media’ is the most effective
interaction between on- and offline (LR Li et al.,
2013). This is why local officials in China are usual-
ly more afraid of media disclosure than of public
appeals and collective action aimed at redressing
wrongs (Jiang, 2000; Shi and Cai, 2006). For exam-
ple, the local government and miners attempted to
conceal the mining accident in Nandan, Guangxi in
2001 for about 15 days, but the People’s Daily, a
newspaper controlled by the central government,
finally exposed it. When the news was released, it not
only resulted in discussion on ‘Strengthening the
Nation Forum’ (QGLT), the virtual community
affiliated with People’s Daily, but also caught the
attention and intervention of the state leader (Yang,
2006; Zheng, 2003).
Discussion and conclusion
This article has attempted to explore online collec-
tive action in China by integrating the demand-sup-
ply theory with relevant research from China and
abroad. In the final section, we summarize the fea-
tures of this new form of political participation for
Chinese people and analyze its effects on social and
political development in China. Based on this, we
suggest future research.
Characteristics of  online collective action 
The evolution of Internet activism in terms of
demand, supply, and mobilization indicates its unde-
niable and controversial effect on social life and
political development in China.
First, scholars have demonstrated that Chinese
people mobilize and participate in traditional collec-
tive action primarily to compensate for material
deficits (Liu, 2009). This does not imply that people
do not want to express their emotions and ideology,
however the lack of formal channels and the high
cost relative to benefits obtained force them to stifle
their complaints. Chinese Netizens feel strongly
about online activism due to instrumental motiva-
tion, but also to express their emotions or for ideo-
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logical expression (G Yang, 2009b). Moreover, with
the growing popularity of the Internet and as aware-
ness grows concerning political participation among
the public, there may be more need for formal or
informal channels, both on- and offline, to express
people’s ‘desire for justice, the sympathy for the
weak, the revulsion of corrupt officials, the disap-
pointment in the government, the mockery of the
rich and authorities, and even the appeal for revolu-
tion’ (G Yang, 2009b: 61, our translation).
Second, in Western democratized countries, col-
lective action is typically part of a long-term cam-
paign or social movement with a clear objective. In
modern China, scholars found that most collective
action on- and offline is transient, spontaneous, and
self-organized; formal organization-based activism is
rare (Liu, 2009; Qiu et al., 2014; G Yang, 2009a).
However, clear organizing structures, leadership, and
division of labor is a new feature of Internet activists
and continue to evolve (G Yang, 2009a).
Finally, the strategies of mobilization and action
are also evolving; that is, instead of blind and emo-
tional action, methods that are more legitimate are
being used, such as applying more legal procedures
and other strategies to avoid state sanctions. For
example, inspired by the success of the anti-PX
event, successors have used the words ‘take a walk,’
‘relieve boredom,’ and ‘heeling’ to replace ‘protest,’
‘assembly,’ and ‘demonstrate’ when they communi-
cate with each other online (Yang, 2006, 2009a).
The effects and future of  online collective
action 
Since online collective action has gained in popular-
ity, scholars have proposed diverse arguments and
opinions regarding the influence of the Internet and
online activism on the construction of society and
politics in China. Some indicate both positive and
negative effects. For example, based on practical
experience, some people believed that the Internet
could assist in cultivating a civil consciousness to
prompt civil society and to expand political liberal-
ization in the future, although the Internet and
online collective action cannot change the political
system in China in the short-term. In fact, though,
some online collective action has already successfully
forced state authorities to modify or substitute cer-
tain policies and regulations (Du, 2009; Lei, 2011;
Qiu, 2009; Yang, 2003; Zheng and Wu, 2005).
Others worry that it will be more difficult to
mobilize collective political action due to the gradu-
ally tightening control on the Internet and the indif-
ference of the majority of people towards politics.
On the other hand, there are danger signs that this
new type of political participation may fall into a
kind of polarizing populism or disrupt social order,
implied in the naively idealistic attitudes towards
cyber activism (Du, 2009; Guo and Wang, 2012;
Zheng and Zhang, 2012).
In summary, since there are too many factors
involved and some questions still need to be
answered, it is difficult to make a clear judgment
regarding the role and future of online collective
action in China. In the future, at least two directions
could be followed. The first is to compare the inter-
action of political policies and public values in online
collective action participation between Western soci-
eties and China. The second one is to explore the rel-
ative importance of instrumentality, identity, and
ideology in online collective action initiated by dif-
ferent kinds of events. 
Acknowledgments
This research was supported by a National Social Science
Major Project Grant (12&ZD218 and 14ZDA063), and
National Social Science Foundation Grant (15BSH034). 
Notes
1. ‘Netizens’ refers to Internet users in China. The
Chinese word is wangmin, which was officially approved
by the PRC’s China National Committee for Terms in
Sciences and Technologies in 1998.
2. Weibo is a type of China-based micro-blogging service
and social network platform, based on relationships and
sharing brief real-time information.
3. Nu River is one of the major rivers in southwest China.
In August 2003, China’s National Development and
Reform Commission approved a proposal to build dams
on the river, which may have resulted in severe environ-
mental damage.
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résumé la popularité d’Internet et de l’activisme en ligne offre au peuple chinois un canal révolution-
naire qui lui permet de s’exprimer et de participer à la politique. Cependant, les recherches actuelles
affichent des perspectives bien différentes. Cet article tente d’intégrer le modèle de l’offre et de la
demande dans des études pertinentes réalisées aussi bien en Chine qu’à l’étranger ; il effectue également
une analyse systématique de la demande, de l’offre et de la mobilisation de l’action collective en ligne afin
de mieux comprendre le contexte général et de développer des théories d’action collective basées sur les
pays occidentaux. L’article traite de l’impact de cette nouvelle forme de participation politique sur le
développement social en Chine et soulève des questions concernant les recherches à venir. 
mots-clés action collective en ligne ◆ demande ◆ mobilisation ◆ offre 
resumen La popularidad de Internet y el activismo online proporcionan un canal revolucionario para
que las personas chinas puedan expresarse y participar en la política. Sin embargo, las investigaciones exis-
tentes ofrecen diferentes perspectivas. Este artículo trata de integrar el modelo de oferta y demanda con
estudios conexos tanto de China como de otros países, a la vez que realiza un análisis sistemático de la
demanda, la oferta y la movilización de la acción colectiva online con el fin de obtener una visión más
amplia y elaborar teorías de acción colectiva basadas en los países occidentales. Se analiza el impacto de
esta nueva forma de participación política en el desarrollo social de China y se plantean preguntas en
relación con las investigaciones futuras.
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